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Private financial markets are central to the implementation of monetary 
governance. This necessary integration of public and private finance means the 
way states govern must evolve with developments in financial markets. This article 
examines how the rise of liability management underpinned a shift to market-based 
banking and transformed the operation of monetary policy in Britain. It assesses 
the period of reform between 1967 and 1981 and what this meant for monetary 
governance. Political economy literature depicts this period as a shift to 
depoliticised, deregulated governance with public authority giving way to market 
power. This paper challenges this perspective on the grounds that it misconstrues 
the problem policymakers faced. The shift from Keynesian to neoliberal monetary 
governance came in response to the change in banking practice with the rise of 
liability management and a parallel money market. This underpinned an explosion 
of credit creation that the old system of monetary policy, organised around the Base 
Rate and ‘primary’ discount market could not fix. As a result, the monetary 
authorities had to render this new financial environment governable. The period 
should therefore be reassessed in terms of the capacities the state attempted to 
construct to conduct monetary governance. 
Keywords: Liability management; sovereign debt management; monetary 
governance; monetary policy. 
 
Introduction 
The global political economy has been transformed by the rise of market-based banking 
(Hardie and Howarth 2013, Tooze 2018). The change in the way banks access and 
manage their liabilities led to an explosion of credit creation in the last four decades that 
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has fundamentally reshaped the terrain upon which political economic life takes place. In 
doing so it of course altered the practice and politics monetary governance. 
It is widely believed that over the last four decades there has been a steady 
marketisation of monetary governance, and with that a creeping depoliticisation as 
policymakers prioritised the monetary stability favoured by financial markets over the 
full employment wishes of electorates (see, for example, Blyth and Matthijs 2017, p. 209). 
In political economy literature this shift is often explained in two broad ways: the capture 
of state institutions by financial interests or ideologies (Davis and Walsh 2016, Pagliari 
and Young 2016, Oren and Blyth 2019), or the structural dependence of the capitalist 
state on the verdicts of financial markets (Clarke 1988, Burnham 2014). 
Mark Blyth, for example, argues that since the mid-1970s state administrators 
became convinced of the idea that democratic intervention into the private economy 
would inevitably bring inflation (Blyth 2013, p. 156) so chose to let market investors 
guide policy instead. Looking to the British case, Davis and Walsh (2016) examine how 
the growing cadre of economists in the British civil service and power of the Treasury 
within the government skewed macroeconomic policy in favour of financial interests. In 
practice this meant limits to state intervention, a focus on price stability and a strong 
currency. As they write (2016, p. 8), ‘The Treasury made a series of changes that were 
designed to free up markets generally (see also Cairncross 1992, Jenkins 2006, Pollard 
1992, Toynbee and Walker 2010) but often worked to benefit financial markets at the 
expense of UK industry.’ 
Alternative, structural accounts like Peter Burnham (2014) look less at the 
ideological and institutional capture of public authorities and more to the way a capitalist 
state is necessarily forced to impose palliative remedies to underlying problems in 
capitalist profitability. Confronted by low growth, high inflation and large government 
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and trade deficits, state managers used public legislative authority to help restructure 
domestic economies in support of capitalist market profit (Clarke 1988). This meant 
overseeing a redistribution from labour to capital. 
Both these perspectives depict the shift from Keynesian to neoliberal monetary 
governance as a move from state-led and politicised governance, to market-led, 
liberalised, competitive, and depoliticised governance (for example, Clarke 1988, 
Gamble 1994, Nesvetailova and Palan 2010, Burnham 2011). 
This depiction of neoliberal monetary governance as a ‘marketisation’ risks 
occluding the constitutive role and political significance of public institutions in what was 
constructed through this period. Rather than a general question of marketisation of the 
state, an alternative understanding of the politics of monetary governance can be reached 
by inquiring about capacity: how do states generate the capacity to think up and 
implement policy? 
This focus on state capacity provides a narrower lens through which to capture 
the specific politics of how the monetary authorities had to react and adapt to the 
emergence of liability management and market-based banking in what proved to be a 
major period of political economic upheaval. 
While many accounts take the stagflation crisis and demise of Bretton Woods 
system as historical anchors for the shift from Keynesian to neoliberal monetary 
governance (see for example Oren and Blyth 2019) I argue we should look elsewhere. 
The growing problem facing the monetary authorities by the end of the 1960s was the 
rise of the parallel money markets and private sources of liquidity that flourished through 
a new practice of banking, termed ‘liability management’ (see Knafo and Beck 2019). 
This involved financial houses lending to customers first, before borrowing corresponding 
liabilities from private money markets. New private money-market instruments like 
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Certificates of Deposits initially, and later repurchase agreements (repos), supported this 
development and underpinned an explosion of liquidity 1 in the decades that followed. 
Importantly, it was this rise of liability management on the Euromarkets that helped erode 
the Bretton Woods apparatus. 
This was a credit revolution, and it was in this context that the British monetary 
authorities undertook a sequence of changes to monetary governance between 1967 and 
1981. These included the 1971 Competition and Credit Control (hereafter ‘CCC’) policy 
that removed direct controls on bank lending, the Minimum Lending Rate (hereafter 
‘MLR’) policy of the same year that changed how the Bank of England set base interest 
rates, and the 1981 Medium Term Financial Strategy (hereafter ‘MTFS’) that committed 
the government to fixed targets for aggregate broad sterling money creation.  
CCC, MLR and the MTFS are often presented as part of the response to the 
broader, periodic capitalist crisis (see, for example, Clarke 1988, Burnham 2014). Given 
the inability of British industry to generate sufficient profits and export income, state 
managers had to devise ways to ‘depoliticise’ monetary governance, granting themselves 
the electoral space to deliver the deflationary restructuring programme demanded by 
financial investors. 
In contrast, I reinterpret this period of monetary change from the vantage point of 
sovereign debt management (SDM). Since monetary governance needs public monetary 
authorities to work with a mix of public and private institutions, and public and private 
financial instruments, the management of sovereign securities provides a useful angle to 
see how governance takes place. I demonstrate how the monetary authorities were 
important constitutive agents in a new form of a politicisation of the infrastructure of 
monetary governance. I do this by exploring how public institutions struggled to generate 
the capacity to undertake monetary governance. In particular, I argue that the CCC, MLR 
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and MTFS should be understood as attempts to control private sector credit creation in 
the age of liability management, something that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
had first demanded after its 1967 bailout of the British state (Clift and Tomlinson 2008). 
In their unsuccessful attempt to ‘muddle through’ they ended up unifying a bifurcated 
money market and providing an alternative basis for conducting monetary policy, though 
it was decades later that the possibilities this created were realised. 
I make two central contributions. First, I bring a hugely important monetary 
history of the rise of liability management and market-based banking to bare on the way 
political economy literature has conceptualised the switch from a so-called Keynesian to 
neoliberal monetary governance in Britain. Second, through the notion of state capacity, 
I establish an important perspective on the relationship between public power and 
monetary governance in the age of neoliberalism. 
This paper is divided into four sections. I begin by demonstrating the limitations 
of the marketisation framing for analysing changes in monetary governance. I show how 
the existing literature depicts the period of transition from 1967 to 1981 as one where the 
British state imposed a market-directed discipline. In the second section I examine the 
place of public debt securities in the financial system and their relation to the private 
banking system in the undertaking of monetary governance. The third section analyses 
the changing financial landscape with the rise of the parallel money market and how that 
necessitated a change in approach to monetary policymaking. The fourth section then 
takes each of the CCC, MLR and MTFS in turn, recasting the changes in light of concerns 
around SDM. The conclusion argues that these reforms have politicised new aspects of 
private finance, intertwining public and private financial instruments and institutions, and 
generating a new capacity for the state to undertake monetary governance. 
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The State in Monetary Reform 
Monetary policy is a central site of the neoliberal revolution (Krippner 2012). The 
rhetorical importance of monetarism in the classic neoliberal cases of Britain, America 
and Chile earned the ‘Chicago Boys’ a place in popular political discourse, while 
academic analysis has focussed on central bank policies as key to the transition from 
postwar Keynesian to contemporary pro-market neoliberal governance (Hall 1993, 
Walter and Wansleben 2019, p. 3) Monetarism itself was a technical analysis about the 
interrelation between fiscal policy, credit creation and general price inflation. Though 
always presented as a technocratic solution to an inflation problem, critics (for example, 
Clarke 1988, Blyth 2013) longed argued that it was highly politicised, instilling an 
economic order ‘that made neoliberal, anti-inflationary policies a priority rather than 
employment or growth’ (McNamara 1998, pp. 5–6 in Clift 2019, p. 1) and ‘paved the way 
for the modern understanding of austerity by making markets always efficient and the 
state always pathological’ (Blyth 2013, p. 154). 
It is why critical literature has long argued the transformation of monetary 
governance in the 1970s and 1980s was political, not economic. As Simon Clarke (1990, 
p. 27 in Burnham 2014, p. 192) put it: 
The driving force behind this [monetarist] restructuring is not so much the attempt 
to provide a resolution to the economic crisis, as the attempt to solve the political 
crisis for the state by trying to disengage the state politically from the economy so 
as to de-politicise economic policy formation. 
 
From this perspective, monetarist reform saw policymaker discretion over fiscal policy 
replaced by fixed rules of monetary policy. Burnham (2011, p. 476) argues that ‘Britain’s 
monetary policymaking between 1972 and 1978 is best understood as an example of 
internal “rule-based depoliticisation”’, something that he saw the continued in the 1981 
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MTFS (2011, 478). 
Within this literature there are often two strands of explanation for the British shift 
in policy between 1967 and 1981. First is the idea that there was a broad ideational and 
institutional shift that saw policymakers align with financial interests. Policymakers came 
to believe that inflation could only be contained by cutting private and social wages. In 
the words of Mark Blyth, state administrators grew convinced that ‘inflation is the … 
inevitable outcome of democratic governments trying to interfere in the economy’ (2013, 
p. 156). As such the solution was to use monetarist rules to ensure markets, rather than 
policymakers, guided government policy. Looking more particularly at struggles within 
the state apparatus itself, Davis and Walsh (2016, p. 4) examine the triumph of the 
Treasury’s ‘finance-linked economic worldview’ over the Department for Trade and 
Industry’s ‘wide industrial vision’. In these more institutionalist studies, there is an idea 
going back to Ingham (1984) that Britain’s political economy is skewed by the 
overlapping interests of the City of London, Bank of England, and Treasury. They have 
a shared preference for price stability, which meant the British state was historically 
reluctant to intervene for industrial strategy, and instead worked to support ‘sound 
finance’ and ‘market forces’. ‘[T]he Thatcher government is not explicitly or intentionally 
pro-City’, wrote Ingham (1984, pp. 220–21). ‘[R]ather economic liberalism and 
monetarism are – as they have been since the early nineteenth century – at the core of 
commercial and wholesale banking capital’s ideology.’ In this way liberalisation, 
marketisation and monetarism are all tied together in Ingham’s framework. This is 
reflected in Green, whose hugely important work depicts the trajectory of monetary 
governance through the 1970s–90s as a creeping neoliberal deregulation, with the City 
taking on a distinctly Anglo-American shape. The American influence is crucial because 
it was when confronted by American competitors, Green writes (2016, p. 246), that 
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‘British banks moved towards universal banking and away from traditional divisions 
between merchant and commercial banking.’ For Green, it was not promarket ideology 
that drove deregulation and marketisation but rather the institutional makeup of the 
British political economy. Marketisation derives from the City-Bank-Treasury nexus that 
has for centuries bent the British political economy to the interests of finance. The 
monetary authorities are thus institutionally captured to support those interests. 
An alternative strand of critical literature challenges this depiction of monetary 
reform. Simon Clarke, Peter Burnham and most incisively Jack Copley instead see 
Britain’s monetary reforms in terms of the British state’s structural dependence on 
financial markets. Locked into global financial markets, policymakers could not yield to 
the demands of their electorate without risking investor backlash in the form of capital 
flight and higher borrowing costs. To placate financial markets and ensure the continued 
viability of capitalism, the state needed to deliver unpopular deflationary programmes. 
For much of the literature, legitimacy of the state, in the eyes of both the electorate 
and financial market investors is a big theme (for example, Best 2018). This structural 
dependence literature traces the institutions and techniques state managers developed to 
‘depoliticise’ economic policy and distance themselves from the electoral consequences 
of their policy choices. The broader aim of this literature is to stress how a liberal national 
state form will necessarily end up sacrificing democratic interests for those of the 
dominant capitalist class, because of its subordination to the global rule of money 
(Konings 2005, p. 102). 
In the context of the 1970s stagflation crisis in Britain this structural tension was 
felt in the way the British state needed to cut imports, consumer spending and wages so 
as to avoid a loss of confidence from international financial markets. Copley (2019, 2017) 
conclusively demonstrates how a range of reforms from the CCC in 1971 to the dissolving 
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of capital controls in 1979 should be understood as state managers attempting to support 
and enforce industrial competitiveness so as to boost exports. Because state-led deflation 
risked democratic backlash, state managers needed to shift the blame and monetary 
reform should be seen in this light. As Peter Burnham (2014, pp. 196–97) argues, the 
reforms involved the state off-loading responsibility by finding ‘an anchor (and 
justification)’ for ‘deflation strategies’, ‘tying policy to statute or clearly identifiable (and 
therefore constraining) targets’. 
In this case, state power is meaningful insofar as it helps the transition to what is 
demanded by capitalist financial markets. Elsewhere, Copley (2017, p. 7) argues that state 
managers were pushed by the stagflation crisis into shifting from direct control on bank 
advances to market-led credit allocation, with the Treasury ‘accept[ing] CCC as way to 
redistribute credit from labour to capital in a depoliticised fashion’. As he shows state 
managers hoped this regressive reallocation of credit would at once help give big business 
‘breathing space’ at a time of declining profitability, while at the same time reduce 
consumer spending that was thought to be worsening inflation and the trade deficit. By 
shifting blame onto ‘the market’ policymakers hoped to shield themselves from the 
unpopularity of these moves. As it turned out CCC was unable to stem the general excess 
of liquidity that drove inflation and the policy was soon abandoned and replaced by the 
MLR. Again here, Burnham (2011) argues state administrators recognised how interest 
rates would have to be substantially higher to slow the pace of credit creation. As such 
‘the MLR was devised to “defuse” the political implications of Bank Rate policy and 
thereby shield the government from the consequences of frequent upward shifts in interest 
rates’ (Burnham 2011, p. 463). Fast forward to Thatcher’s MTFS, where the chancellor 
set and announced fixed targets for monetary growth and let interest rates climb to 
whatever was required to achieve those targets, the idea was to lock in a deflationary 
NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY (pre-proof) 
 
 10 
policy programme. The imposition of rules way was a ‘lynchpin of economic policy’ 
according to Burnham (2014, p. 197). ‘When this strategy [of depoliticisation] is 
successful’, writes Copley (2019, p. 5), ‘the authorities can hope to attain credibility in 
the eyes of global financial markets’. 
In both the state capture and structural dependence perspectives, the politics of 
monetary governance is analysed in terms of the extent of marketisation. Public 
institutions – be it the Treasury, the Bank of England or the Prime Minister’s office – use 
legislative authority to either challenge financial markets, as is thought to characterise the 
Keynesian era, or to secure the favour of financial markets, as is thought characterise 
neoliberalism. 
These accounts suggest there has been a marketisation of monetary governance 
under neoliberalism. This entails the state acting primarily to uphold market interests by 
fostering competition, liberalising banking and attempting industrial renewal. All of 
which to secure financial market favour. For all the institutional detail involved, the 
implication is that the transformation from Keynesian to neoliberal monetary governance 
is fundamentally an abdication of state control for the needs of the market. 
By contrast, I suggest moving away from the marketisation framework. Monetary 
governance should not be always conceptualised in terms of whether public authority is 
used either to constrain financial markets, or to work in their favour. Rather, to understand 
the politics of monetary governance we can examine not only who it serves – as is 
common – but how. In particular, the infrastructural question of how public authorities 
develop the capacity to act on financial markets; what institutions, instruments and 
techniques are mobilised and what impacts this has. Monetary policy operates primarily 
through three channels: Collateral framework, where the central bank designates which 
securities will be accepted to meet banks’ reserve requirements, lending through the 
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discount window, and open market dealings on the money markets. In doing so monetary 
policymaking and monetary governance necessarily involves mobilising public and 
private financial institutions and instruments. 
For this, SDM provides an important vantage point. It provides a different 
perspective on the problems the monetary authorities were confronting through the 
sequence of monetary forms that took place between 1967 and 1981. As I will 
demonstrate, the related developments the parallel sterling money markets and the 
practice of liability management fundamentally altered the terrain upon which public and 
private financial institutions acted. They allowed the financial sector to ramp up credit 
creation by bypassing the primary sector where the Bank Rate had an influence over the 
cost of liquidity (Revell 1973). With its primary policy lever broken, state managers 
scrambled for solutions, and the repeated experiments in monetary governance should be 
read in this light of muddling through, as Jacqueline Best (2019) has recently put it. That 
the state now is thought to govern through markets (Braun et al. 2018) speaks of the new 
capacities that were established over this period. 
Sovereign Debt Management: A Matter of Statecraft 
There is a deep and necessary entanglement between the public and private in financial 
markets. The banking mechanism, ultimately, requires public-sector liquidity creation to 
settle payments; while public authorities must act through private sector money markets 
to undertake monetary governance and influence interest rates. 
Alongside familiar concerns about the legitimacy of monetary policy in the eyes 
of both citizen voters and financial market investors, and the macro impacts of changes 
in interest rate policy, any examination of monetary governance must explore the 
infrastructural basis of public power. That is the institutions, instruments and practices by 
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which public authorities construct the ability to determine, implement and evaluate policy 
objectives. 
Sovereign debt securities are a key part of private financial markets. The 
management of sovereign debt instruments is, as such, central to the operation of private 
sector actors, making it fertile ground for considering questions of governance and 
statecraft. As I demonstrate, one key challenge of governance is establishing the capacity 
to make policy. Doing so requires the mobilisation of a vast swathe of public and private 
institutions which necessarily means there is a disjuncture between the intentions of 
policymakers and the outcome of their policies. For this reason, the politics of monetary 
governance can be understood not only in terms of cui bono but also the infrastructural 
problem of what makes governability possible. 
This is especially apparent in the period I examine, where policymakers’ repeated 
attempts to control financial markets, credit creation especially, failed so spectacularly. 
In particular, I highlight how the big shift that took place between 1967 and 1981 should 
be cast as an evolving, often chaotic response to a radical transformation of the money 
market with the development of practices of liability management by US banks operating 
on London’s parallel money markets. This dramatically altered the relation between retail 
and wholesale banking in Britain, with the retail, deposit-taking banking sector – which 
revolved around the discount houses and Bank of England – being rapidly 
disintermediated as wholesale money markets grew in size and significance. Along the 
way state-created Treasury Bills were replaced by private sector Certificates of Deposits 
(hereafter ‘CDs’) and later Repurchase Agreements (hereafter ‘Repos’) as the dominant 
liquid asset in the banking system. The rise of the parallel markets necessitated a shift in 
the way the monetary authorities conducted financial governance and is what drove the 
repeated experiments in monetary reforms that are today considered so crucial. 
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In focussing on SDM, I take up Fastenrath et al.’s (2017) challenge to look less at 
the aggregate level or cost of sovereign debt and more about the makeup of sovereign 
debt. However, I differ from their approach (and others like Lemoine 2016) because my 
interest is not in the distinction between ‘marketable’ and ‘non-marketable’ sovereign 
securities. Rather it is about how different sovereign securities relate to the broader 
banking system and what this means for monetary governance. 
In what follows I demonstrate how both the state capture, and structural 
dependence accounts of the evolution of monetary governance in Britain can be 
complimented by a focus on state capacity. From a historical vantage point, it becomes 
possible to see that these literatures risk both exaggerating the agency of the state before 
the neoliberal revolution, and downplaying it after. It is precisely why many authors (for 
example, Nesvetailova and Palan 2010, Pettifor 2014, Braun 2018) depict Keynesian 
governance as ‘active’ and ‘state-led’ and neoliberal governance as ‘rule-bound’ and 
‘market-led’. The capacity of public and para-public monetary institutions to influence 
financial markets is not a given and not simply a question of policymaker desire. Instead 
I show how the history of monetary governance has always involved a struggle for the 
public institutions to render private finance governable, in the sense of developing the 
techniques and organised practices through which finance and the economy could be 
governed (see Braun 2018). 
A Struggle for Capacity: The Prehistory of Postwar Monetary Policy 
The key shift that took place was a transformation in the money markets. It shifted the 
way banking operated, who the key operators were and necessitated a change in the 
infrastructural basis for monetary governance. As I demonstrate, the way state-created 
liquidity relates to private liquidity instruments has always been crucial to the question 
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of monetary governance and the possibilities of macroeconomic policy. This is central to 
the changing politics of monetary reform witnessed in the neoliberal period. This section 
analyses how these changes laid the foundation for the policy experiments that took place 
between 1967 and 1981. 
Establishing the Discount Market 
By the end of the second world war the English monetary system centred on the 
relationship between the Bank of England, the Discount Market, and the joint-stock 
clearing banks. These clearing banks had risen to dominance through the second half of 
the nineteenth century and it was through these banks that the payments function of the 
banking system operated. Individuals and businesses could accept payment in cash or by 
transferring deposits between the clearing banks. The capacity of these bank deposits 
(liabilities) to be accepted as a means of payment depended on bank customers feeling 
confident that they could withdraw their deposits as cash whenever they pleased. Clearing 
banking worked by turning state-backed liquidity – coins, cash, and deposits at the central 
bank into clearing bank deposits, and back again. To ensure confidence and stability in 
this process the clearing banks were subjected to rules that, by 1967, meant they had to 
hold 8 per cent of their deposits as cash and 28 per cent of their total assets as approved 
‘liquid assets’ (the cash and liquidity ratio, respectively) (Revell 1973, p. 144). The sector 
was highly concentrated with the big five clearing banks holding a vast share of retail 
deposits throughout much of the postwar period. To balance the need to hold large liquid 
reserves with the desire for an interest rate margin for profit, the clearers used the discount 
houses. Here they could make deposits in call money or Treasury Bills and earn a slim 
interest. But if any one clearer had a sudden customer demand for cash, they could retrieve 
this money ‘at call’. If the entire clearing bank sector had collective withdrawal of their 
deposits, and the discount houses were themselves left short of cash, the Bank of England 
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would make cash available as the lender of last resort. The Bank was therefore at the apex 
of the short-term liquidity provision. Though it would always extend cash, the rate at 
which it was lent – the Bank Rate – was the anchor rate for short-term liquidity provision 
in the discount market. As it was the transmission for monetary policy and, in 
combination with the cash and liquidity ratios, was the key infrastructural architecture of 
monetary governance. 
Under this arrangement, though deposit banks could grow the broad money 
supply when issuing loans, they operated much more so on a ‘loanable funds’ practice 
than contemporary banks. The effort had been made through the nineteenth century to 
grow the branch network and deepen the deposit base, which is why the clearing bank 
system was so well equipped for the payments function, but there were clear impediments 
to credit creation. 
Until the first world war Bank of England reserves were extended to the discount 
houses secured against private commercial bills of exchange. Yet wartime financing 
dramatically altered this balance between public and private liquidity. Government short-
term borrowing was £16 million in August 1914 and £1.5 billion by November 1918, 
most of which came from the clearing banks (Mitchie 2004, p. 254). It was financed 
primarily through forced sales of Treasury Bills to the clearing bank system, rapidly 
growing the presence of short-term public sector securities in providing liquidity to the 
financial system. The trend continued through the second world war, leaving £2.73 billion 
of Treasury Bills circulating by 1946 (Allen 2014, p. 36). 
This made Treasury Bills the central liquidity instrument in the discount market 
when peacetime began (Radcliffe report 1959). It is no coincidence that after the war 
Keynes found such purchase with his arguments that the terms by which the state made 
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liquidity available to the financial system could be of crucial importance to pulling the 
country out of recession (Tily 2010). 
The Rise of Parallel Money and the Crisis of the Discount Market 
The great shift that takes place is the rise of a secondary banking system that developed 
in parallel to the established, Bank of England backed, system. The secondary market had 
its own secondary banks – that initially did not accept retail deposits – and crucially its 
own parallel money market that developed separately to the discount market. 
The secondary banks were largely international houses (from the United States 
predominantly) and were consortium, universal banks. They came to the City of London 
largely on the Euromarkets which the British monetary authorities had passively and 
actively nurtured. The rise of the market in Eurodollars and other money market 
instruments in ‘parallel’ to the discount houses had a revolutionary impact on banking 
practice, credit provision and monetary governance. 
The distinctions between primary and secondary banking systems are crucial. The 
primary system was, as I’ve described, forged on deposit-taking clearing banks whose 
primary role was the payments function and who organised their liquidity management 
through widening their branch network and relying on the discount houses. The secondary 
system was largely wholesale banks, taking few but large deposits and making few but 
large loans. Their primary problem was one of ‘matching’ their assets to liabilities and 
they made active use of the emerging parallel money markets to do so. This active liability 
management flipped traditional banking on its head. As one senior clearing banker told 
Margaret Reid (2003, p. 59): ‘Almost for the first time in banking history you found your 
lending business then scurried round for deposits.’ What this meant was that rather than 
passively build a pool of deposits and use the discount market, banks would lend first – 
issue assets – and then find the liabilities by borrowing short-term on the newly 
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developing private, parallel money markets. As Gardner notes this helped move banking 
in the UK from being largely ‘deposit driven’ to ‘advances driven’: ‘No longer did banks 
have to wait for deposits to flow in before they could expand loan volume. They now had 
the managerial option of deciding, first, to expand loans and, secondly, actively securing 
the needed deposits’ (Gardener 1985, p. 2). 
The rise of the parallel wholesale money market was, in that sense, the rise of 
market-based banking in the UK and it took place in an American image. It was US banks 
leading this charge and fundamentally shifted the practice of credit provision. Liability 
management was a high-stakes tightrope walk. Banks needed to ensure that the many 
loans they advanced could be financed with equivalent liabilities they shopped round for 
on the parallel markets. Ideally, their balance sheets would be self-liquidating, with loans 
of various risks and maturities being ‘matched’ with equivalents. Yet in practice liability 
management meant lending long and borrowing short, with a regular turnover of 
liabilities being needed to meet their financing needs (Gardener 1983, 1985). Flexibility 
in money market instruments was, as such, crucial to the developing parallel market, and 
in particular was skewed to being able to access short-term, liquid instruments. The key 
innovation that underpinned the success of liability management and the capacity for 
private banks to rapidly extend liquidity was the development of CDs (Degen 1987, p. 
131). This of course had profound implications for any hopes of establishing controlling 
credit creation, but it is something that is often overlooked in the literature on the 
monetary reforms that took place over the 1970s and early 1980s in Britain. 2 The 
secondary banks needed to be able to offer deposit instruments that were almost as liquid 
as clearing bank deposits but with marginally higher interest rates – and CDs were also a 
way of doing this. ‘Introduced in the banking system in the early 1960s’, as Minsky later 
identified (1986, p. 85), ‘[CDs] soon became a favourite vehicle for the investing of large-
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scale holdings of short-term funds. The growth of CDs in the early 1960s enabled bank 
credit to expand substantially faster than the reserve base.’ It was as such new money 
market instruments, the new parallel money market and the emergence of a new practice 
of liability management that allowed the financial system to extend credit well beyond 
what any notion of reserves or deposits might imply. 
A Bifurcated System and the Problem of Monetary Governance 
By the end of the 1960s there were two banking systems in place in Britain. The monetary 
authorities faced the problem that the traditional banking system over which they had 
both traditional qualitative authority and technical regulatory control (via cash and 
liquidity ratios and Bank of England liquidity provision) was being rapidly 
disintermediated by new secondary banks on the parallel money markets. Clearing banks 
had operated as a cartel offering fixed and low interest rates to depositors and only ever 
shifting rates together. The secondary houses, however, offered better terms on deposits 
and this lead to a reduction in the Big Five clearing banks’ share of total deposits 
(Channon 1977). Unless the cartel ended, and banks were forced to compete for deposits 
by offering higher rates to savers, the disintermediation of the traditional financial system 
would continue. Moreover, the rise of CDs meant private liquid assets had replaced 
Treasury Bills as the dominant money market instrument. The transformation was clear. 
Treasury bills had made up 67 per cent of total short-term sterling instruments in 1957, 
but by 1979 accounted for just 6 per cent (Collins 1988, p. 361). This decline in state-
rationed liquidity began in the 1950s and 1960s and coincided with the emergence of 
privately issued CDs. It was a rapid transformation as well. The first sterling CDs were 
issued in 1968, a year later total holdings stood at £442 million and by 1971 had grown 
to £2242 million (Revell 1973, p. 280). While the clearing banks settled their payments 
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in state-created cash and Bank of England reserves, the secondary banks settled in 
deposits, generating the capacity for credit creation to stretch well beyond reserves. 
The result of which was that the monetary authorities faced two related problems 
heading into the 1970s: First was how to stem disintermediation of the clearing bank 
sector. Second was how to make monetary policy effective in a context where the rise of 
liability management meant there appeared little possible avenue for credit control. As 
Early & Evans put it (1982, p. 55) liability management broke ‘the three-way link that 
once connected the volume of bank reserves (monetary base); the volume of demand or 
checkable bank deposits (money) and the level of bank lending’. With short-term liquidity 
being managed through the parallel money market and often through interbank deposits 
or short-term instruments like CDs and later repos, the Bank Rate set on the discount 
market no longer anchored the cost of short-term liquidity. 
In order to solve these two problems, the monetary authorities needed to render 
governable a banking system that was increasingly organised around liability 
management. The issue of what monetary governance looked like in conditions of 
unlimited credit was to become a pressing problem that drove the series of reforms that 
took place over the 1970s and 1980s: CCC (Copley 2017), the MLR (Burnham 2011), 
and the MTFS (Thain and Wright 1995). 
Monetary Reforms: A History of Failed Discipline 
By revisiting how the changing financial landscape affected SDM and the state’s capacity 
to undertake monetary governance and implement monetary policy, I have established an 
alternative foundation to analyse the monetary reforms that followed the 1967 IMF 
bailout and the emphasis on monetary control it introduced. Though this was a period of 
rapid change with the stagflation crisis and demise of the Bretton Woods regime, there is 
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utility in narrowing the analytical lens and examining the money market developments 
more closely. It was the development of liability management on the parallel money 
markets that undid much of Bretton Woods long before its formal demise and the problem 
of inflation stemmed more from the credit revolution than it did Keynesian fiscal policy. 
In overlooking the transformation that had taken place on the money markets with 
the rise of parallel banks and the impact of liability management, and anchoring to the 
stagflation crisis and fall of Bretton Woods, the political economy scholarship of various 
stripes (for example, Blyth 2003, Gamble 1994 and Hall 1993) often ends up presenting 
neoliberal monetary governance as a story of competition, liberalisation and deregulation. 
In contrast, in what follows, I show how the monetary authorities were struggling with 
the problem of capacity building, namely how to render rapidly evolving financial 
markets governable and generate the capacity to even attempt to instil monetary control. 
Control through Competition? The Competition and Credit Control Experiment 
It is my contention that the monetary changes are best read in terms of the way the 
developments on the money market contradicted with the growing emphasis on monetary 
control. Once the IMF first mooted controlling credit creation with its suggested Domestic 
Credit Expansion targets in 1967, the idea became more deeply ingrained among the 
monetary authorities (Clift and Tomlinson 2008). It is why though monetary discipline 
was made more explicitly a macroeconomic objective post the 1976 IMF intervention, it 
had already been an issue for a decade by then. 
The difficulty was that the rise of the parallel banks and secondary money market 
gave them very few levers to effect control. The more the Treasury tried to tighten the 
direct controls and lending ceilings it had used to direct clearing bank lending since the 
second world war, the stronger the hand of the parallel banks which did not face such 
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restrictions, and the greater the disintermediation problem (Goodhart 2014, p. 2, Hotson 
2017, p. 126). The separation of retail banking around the discount market and wholesale 
banking around the parallel market was disintegrating and the monetary authorities 
needed a response. 
The clearing bank sector, who had to meet the strict reserve and liquidity ratios, 
could not leverage and lend to the same extent as the nascent secondary houses. And this 
formal difference between the ‘two’ money markets was an issue that the CCC changes 
addressed. Heath’s stated aim of ‘disengaging the state’ meant a bonfire of direct controls 
on clearing banks assets and the imposition of a new plan for reserve requirements. Rather 
than solely clearing banks having been bound to hold 8 per cent of cash deposits and 28 
per cent of liquid assets (which were established after the 1959 Radcliffe Report), the 
CCC changes shifted this to a single 12.5 per cent reserve asset ratio. This was to apply 
to all banks – primary and secondary – and eligible assets included Treasury Bills, money 
at call, gilts with less than a year’s maturity and some local authority and commercial 
bills (Hotson 2017, p. 136). These were all still predominantly traded in the discount 
market and could be seen as an attempt to push a certain re-intermediation of the 
traditional sector (Revell 1973, p.215). In addition, all banks were required to hold cash 
balances at the Bank of England amounting to 1.5 per cent of ‘eligible assets’. 
The view of the monetary authorities was that changing the reserve ratios, and 
lifting the direct restrictions on clearing bank asset growth would mean Britain’s clearing 
bank cartel would end. Instead they would be forced to compete, and this would drive a 
growth in size and capitalisation (Goodhart 2014). This, it was hoped, would check the 
progress being made by parallel banks, who were raising liabilities from wholesale money 
markets from which to fund their rapidly expanding asset base. This would thereby restore 
the primacy of the discount market and Bank Rate (Moran 1983, p. 59). What this meant 
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in practice was letting the clearing banks lend as much as they wanted, and trying to 
impose monetary control solely through the Bank Rate instead (Davies 2012). 
The CCC policy is often depicted as a great deregulation of banking. Evidence of 
either the emerging pro-market consensus developing in Britain, or the structural realities 
of a declining productive sector that necessitated the state take a less explicit and more 
depoliticised role in the way credit was allocated. 
Yet I’d argue it is more revealing to see CCC in the opposite light. It was a reform 
that emerged in response to the impacts already unleashed by the credit revolution that I 
described in the previous section. CCC was an attempt to really try and make interest 
rates a powerful and flexible lever, in the place of direct controls that were no longer 
viable. As it happened the only lasting effect of CCC, with its emphasis on varying rates, 
was to radically destabilise the gilt market. 
CCC could not contain the impacts of liability management and as such proved 
wildly ineffective at reining in credit creation. Yet it did have a profound impact on the 
clearing banks (Moran 1983, p.55). To recall, before CCC lifted caps on their asset 
growth, they operated as a cartel with a fixed spread between their lending and deposit 
rates. As Revell put it (1973, p. 156) two years after the reforms: ‘By making use of the 
wholesale markets on both sides of their balance sheets the deposit banks have blurred 
the distinctions that formerly existed between deposit banks and secondary banks.’ In the 
immediate aftermath a ‘merry go round’ developed between the two money markets. The 
more wholesale deposit rates increased the more that corporate treasuries could borrow 
from the retail sector (usually on overdraft) and deposit these in the wholesale secondary 
sector by buying sterling CD assets (Hotson 2017, p. 136). This borrow-to-deposit 
strategy came to be known as ‘round tripping’ and drove a huge increase in credit 
creation. It exposed the fundamental flaws in the reasoning driving CCC. To recall the 
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authorities were trying to bring credit creation under control through increasing interest 
rates. Though manifestly not the case, they ran with the idea that if clearing banks offered 
high enough rates, customers would save rather than borrow. This was based on a 
supposedly stable money demand function that was published in the 1970 Bank of 
England quarterly bulletin. But it proved a mirage and borrowed continued apace. By the 
time CCC was abandoned in 1973, the broad money supply (M3) had increased by an 
eyewatering 72 per cent, credit had spiralled, and asset-bubbles had blown (Needham 
2014, p. 46). 
One route to understand the politics of the shift in monetary governance that CCC 
involved is to see it as the early emergence of a deregulatory zeitgeist that had taken hold, 
particular in the offshore ‘zone’ of the Euromarkets. Another would be to depict CCC as 
a regulatory response to a broader, external crisis of capitalist profitability. The move 
away from direct controls to a more nebulous attempt at interest rate control was an 
attempt to divert capital allocation from consumers to a struggling industrial sector, while 
at the same time quelling the political disquiet. Instead, I argue that CCC should be read 
as an early attempt by the monetary authorities to rebuild the governance capacity that 
was being rapidly eroded by the rise of liability management. 
Response to Failure: The MLR 
The failure of CCC to deliver on the stated promise of monetary control emphasised how 
the Bank Rate had lost its position as the anchor of short-term interest rates. Of more 
relevance was the interbank short-term lending that took place on the secondary money 
market. Even as early as December 1970 secondary banks lent 50 per cent as much as 
clearing banks to non-financial companies, substantially shifting the common UK model 
of overdraft lending (Revell 1973, p. 243). CCC had worked to dissolve the separation 
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between Britain’s two banking systems but, with quantitative controls on clearing banks 
rendered unsustainable post liability management, the question of how to undertake 
monetary policy remained live. What the monetary authorities needed was a way to bring 
wholesale rates in line with that set by the Bank on the discount market. In trying to bring 
them into line the authorities hoped to make the Bank Rate effective in setting the price 
of liquidity. As Burnham (2011) writes, the Minimal Lending Rate (MLR) was, then, the 
first move away from using the discount window to set the Bank Rate and instead set it 
in reference to the prices established in the weekly Treasury Bill tenders. To recall, the 
discount window set a ceiling on the price of liquidity but not a floor. In order to ‘make 
the Bank Rate effective’ (on the discount window) the Bank of England had always had 
to try and manufacture a liquidity shortage in the clearing banks. This it did by issuing 
Treasury Bills to discount houses, who were compelled to buy them, draining the discount 
houses of available cash, which in turn fed back to the clearing banks. The result of which 
was that liquidity could only be borrowed from the Bank of England via the discount 
houses on the discount window, at a decreed interest rate: the Bank Rate (Allen 2014). In 
that sense, there was nothing new about the Bank of England’s interventionist dealings in 
Treasury Bills. 
What did change with the MLR was where the official rate was set. In its Treasury 
Bill dealings, if the Bank chose only to buy back Treasury Bills at low prices, it was able 
to force short-term interest rates up, independently of the ‘discounting’ price for liquidity 
set by the old Bank Rate. It was, in this sense, the centring of Open Market Operations 
that has come to be the primary channel through which monetary policy is implemented. 
When in October 1972 the MLR policy was announced, it involved using this capacity 
more actively. In a general sense the change from Bank Rate to MLR did distance the 
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Heath government from interest rate changes in the way Burnham and others have since 
described. It implied this was a market-set rather than state-decreed official rate. 
Yet the broader political impact of the MLR should be seen in terms of the way it 
brought open market operations more clearly to the centre of monetary policymaking. 
The nascent market-based banking that had emerged through the parallel money markets 
had undone the old transmission belt of monetary policy, the discount market. The MLR 
can be seen, in Revell’s (1973, p. 216) terms as ‘a final blow to the importance of the 
Bank Rate’, formally recognising the infrastructural shift that had already taken place. 
The move towards a greater emphasis of open market operations and active intervention 
into short-term liquidity instruments would later become the basis for modern monetary 
policymaking in the era of market-based banking. Yet at this stage, the MLR had done 
little to quell the rampant growth of bank balance sheets. 
Sado-Monetarism? The Curious Case of the Medium Term Financial Strategy 
It is clear that driving this period of successive, failed monetary reforms was the credit 
revolution that arrived with US-bank practices of liability management on the parallel 
money markets. Monetary discipline was, in the sense of limiting credit creation, proving 
beyond the capacity of the monetary authorities. That did not, however, stop repeated 
governments attempting to do so. Turning to the case of the MTFS, it is worth recalling 
the history that preceded it. Britain’s continued balance of payments problems saw it turn, 
once again, to the IMF in 1976. The infamous £3.5 billion loan package became highly 
symbolic because it came with ‘monetarist’ conditionality on targeted monetary growth 
(Clift and Tomlinson 2008). Yet for all its infamy, the targets and the policies that 
followed them, did not differ substantially from what had come in the previous eight 
years. As Burk and Cairncross (1992, p. 228) described: ‘Apart from the continued issue 
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of monetary targets, which were rarely hit, economic policy in the last years of the Labour 
government differed little from what it had been before the arrival of the IMF.’ It is why 
the focus on monetary discipline should not be seen as a purely Thatcherite or even post 
1976 development. Nonetheless, monetary targets and their accompanying rhetoric of 
‘market-led governance’, formed a crucial plank of Thatcher’s rise to power and her early, 
brutal economic experiment, the MTFS (Clift and Tomlinson 2012). 
The MTFS was simply a framework for economic strategy that outlined fixed 
financial objectives for monetary and fiscal policy. It was supposed to signal a final move 
away from the ‘discretion’ of policymakers to fixed, publicly announced principles. And 
the implication of the MTFS was clear: while previous governments had squandered price 
stability by falling to the expansionary demands of the electorate, Thatcher’s 
administration would deliver pure deflation if it had to. There would be no political 
‘interference’ muddying the quantified economic framework laid out by the targets (Kerr 
2001). On the face of it, this was deflationary depoliticisation for the market confidence. 
Yet these targets did not act as ‘an anchor’ in the way Burnham (2014, pp. 196–
197) describes as a necessary aspect of depoliticisation. Rather, the rules and targets were 
entirely ignored (Cobham 2003). Not only were they incoherent and entirely unexplained 
but there was quite a contrast between the fanfare of the targets published in the MTFS, 
and the rest of the Thatcher administration’s economic policies. Certainly between 1979–
1982 some of the choices on fiscal policy did not align with the MTFS aims on inflation 
targets (Prasad 2006). 
More importantly, because of the way the monetary authorities treated M3 as a 
basic function of the government’s deficit spending (the Public Sector Net Borrowing 
Requirement, (hereafter ‘PSBR’)) it cast a monetary problem in fiscal terms. This is 
necessarily misleading because the dominant push for credit creation came from bank 
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created money. The credit revolution is the principle reason that monetary targeting was 
so particularly difficult. Yet its importance is overlooked because of the overly broad, 
fiscal-first framework through which the depoliticisation literature reads monetary policy. 
Banks could not only fund their asset expansion by acquiring liabilities from wholesale 
markets, but were now beginning to securitise their own assets and sell them to facilitate 
further lending (Smith 1987). The effect of the development of liability management was 
to drive credit creation. Moreover, the rise in the proportion of financial intermediaries’ 
deposits that were interest-bearing reduced the interest-elasticity of the demand for 
money (Cobham 2003, p. 39). The contradiction between an incoherent fiscal policy 
programme, combining tax cuts with public sector spending cuts, and incoherent 
monetary and financial policy programme – promising to cut credit creation through 
nonsensical MTFS targets, while at the same time removing impediment to bank asset 
growth like the Supplementary Special Deposit ‘corset’ scheme. The result of this, 
unsurprisingly, was that all targets – on M3, on PSBR, on expected GDP growth – were 
missed. 
Critical accounts of the period treat the creation of new public rules for 
policymaking through the MTFS as examples of the power of financial interests, the 
ideology of monetary discipline, or a state-led project for securing financial market 
liberalisation. The fact that the rules were ineffective and ignored is not confronted. If, 
instead, the focus shifted to a question of state capacity it is possible to see the MTFS in 
terms of the struggle to govern a radically changed financial sector where private credit 
creation dominated. It is clear that the monetary authorities had to respond. As Paul 
Tucker (in Bank of England 2004, p. 363), executive director for markets at the Bank of 
England, later put it: ‘The Bank had to stop relying on a moribund market (the bill market) 
and atrophied institutions (the discount houses)’. 
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Moreover, it had to adjust to the reality that monetary discipline, in the form of 
controlled credit creation was never going to happen. Once the liability management 
genie was out of the bottle, it was not going back in. 
History since has of course reiterated the point. Rather than resist credit creation, 
successive governments since the early 1980s have relied on rapid credit creation to 
uphold a debt-based model of economic growth in the British economy (see Green and 
Lavery 2018), the very opposite of any notion of monetary discipline that so much of the 
literature deems significant. 
Conclusion: Repoliticising Monetary Governance 
The purpose of this article was to use a focus on SDM as a foundation for rethinking the 
way political economy literature examines the transition from Keynesian to neoliberal 
monetary governance in Britain. I used the necessary intertwining of public and private 
institutions in the conduct of monetary policy to examine the way public institutions 
began the remaking of monetary governance in the era of liability management and 
market-based banking. 
These changes are depicted in much critical literature as a marketisation of 
monetary governance. While channels of state action have changed, I argue monetary 
governance this has shift has not seen an abdication of state interventionary capacity in 
favour of a generic financial market interest. Rather, through the CCC, MLR and MTFS 
changes, alongside later regulatory reforms like the 1986 Big Bang (Dutta, 2018) and 
1995 repo markets (Gabor, 2016), the monetary authorities established the basis of a 
modern form of governance. 
The altered transmission mechanism of monetary policy has established a densely 
interconnected and mutually dependent relationship between the shadow banking sector 
and state financial securities, in particular through the repo market (Gabor, 2016). At once 
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this relationship has strengthened the ‘infrastructural power’ of finance (Braun 2018) but 
also opened up new opportunities for state action. The response of the state post-financial 
crisis was to undertake staggeringly large monetary interventions. The Bank of England 
has purchased £427 billion of the government’s own debt issues (Bank of England, 2018) 
to facilitate a form of monetary stimulus in the British economy that has benefited a 
narrow band of asset owners (Bank of England, 2012) and swap public securities for the 
financial assets of carbon-intensive corporations (Matikainen et al., 2017). Though clearly 
not progressive politics, it is very difficult to grasp this mode of power, and hold it to 
account, with the notion of ‘marketisation’ or ‘depoliticisation’. By demonstrating how 
new financial markets and instruments were politicised – that is rendered amenable to 
state influence – this article provides a foundation for conceptualising the politics of 
modern monetary governance. 
Notes 
1. Alessandri and Haldane (2009) show how return on equity for UK banks jumped 
from around 5 to 25 per cent between 1966 and 1972, the period I refer to broadly 
as the credit revolution, with banks rapidly reducing their ratio of liquid assets to 
total assets. Moreover, having declined since the end of the second world war, UK 
banking assets as a percentage of GDP began to grow rapidly in the late 1960s, 
crossing over 100 per cent of GDP by 1975. 
 
2. Konings (2011) has examined the importance of CDs to American financial 
development and Revell (1968) made one of the first and most important analyses 
of the rise of secondary banking and CDs in Britain. 
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